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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
SAFETY ACT I V I TI E S 
By C h a r l e s  N. Rice 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center  
SUMMARY 
The success  of the United States manned space-flight program has been, to a 
great  extent, a direct result  of the emphasis placed on safety by NASA management. 
The reorganization of the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (formerly the Manned 
Spacecraft Center) safety efforts after the Apollo spacecraft 204 fire was necessary 
for  a concerted safety effort. Al l  the relevant safety activities were coordinated 
through a single office and resulted in  a strong, centralized approach to crew and 
mission safety. The establishment of a formal documented hazard analysis for each 
mission was effective in  identifying significant hazards and assuring satisfactory 
resolution of hazards a t  an appropriate high level i n  the Lyndon B. Johnson Space 
Center organization. 
A safety program requires an adequate complement of qualified engineers, a 
free hand to conduct independent assessments ,  and the full support of top management. 
With these ingredients, an effective safety program is assured. 
The Manned Flight Awareness Program introduced early in  the Apollo Program 
was a motivational program to achieve a high level of safety, reliability, and quality 
consciousness of all program participants. I ts  success w a s  greatly enhanced by 
astronaut participation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The success  of the United States manned space-flight program has been, to a 
great  extent, a direct  resul t  of the emphasis placed on safety by NASA management. 
The basic safety objective has  been to identify hazards and to ensure that these hazards 
a r e  either eliminated o r  reduced to an  acceptable level. With the exceptions of the 
Apollo spacecraft  (SC) 204 fire and perhaps the Apollo 13 mission, the hazards had 
been adequately identified and properly resolved. Throughout the series of manned 
space-flight programs (Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo), the safety of the crew was 
given pr imary  consideration during hardware design, manufacturing, testing, mission 
planning, and flight operations. 
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the safety-oriented activities of 
personnel at  the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) (formerly the Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC)) and a t  major contractor plant si tes.  Although everyone is 
expected to be safety conscious, some things that are inherently unsafe under certain 
conditions are not easily recognized. The identification of hazards requires  a 
dedicated and conscious effort by appropriately trained safety personnel who possess  
the experience and capability to properly assess the r i sks  throughout all phases of 
the manned program and to take appropriate action to eliminate or  reduce the r i sks  
to an acceptable level. 
During Project  Mercury, the Gemini Program, and the early stages of the 
Apollo Program, a Flight Safety Gffice a t  MSC reported to the Center Director. The 
function of this office was to coordinate the overall safety effort at  NASA and the 
major contractors. It had a small  staff and acted in  an  advisory capacity to each 
program office. Throughout Project Mercury and the Gemini Program,  ‘crew safety 
and mission safety activities were carr ied out by the Flight Safety Office, the respon- 
sible program offices, and the engineering and other support groups a t  both NASA 
centers  and major contractors.  This method worked well because the groups were 
small  enough for the individuals to maintain good communications, were personally 
known to each other,  and had a broad view of the requirements so that the safety 
efforts were well  integrated. 
A s  the Apollo Program progressed from design definition to hardware fabrica- 
tion, substantial numbers of new personnel were added to the program, numerous 
reassignments of personnel were made, and functional reorganizations were imple- 
mented over a period of months. Coupled with these changes, the hardware testing 
phases brought added activity, and the resolution of tes t  hardware failures absorbed 
more and more time. During this period, the s ize  and technical makeup of the Flight 
Safety Office did not grow sufficiently to maintain visibility into the rapidly expanding 
Apollo Spacecraft Program hardware and procedures activities. All  the above 
resulted in some loss  of communication and visibility between the Flight Safety Office 
and the engineering and tes t  operational elements. 
After the Apollo SC-204 fire, one of the organizational changes made a t  MSC 
grouped most of the Center safety organizations into the Flight Safety Office reporting 
directly to the Center Director. Another change was the creation of a staff position 
in  the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) as the MSC point of contact with the 
Apollo Systems Safety Office at NASA Headquarters. This  staff position, called the 
ASPO Assistant Program Manager for  Flight Safety, was a position designed to 
expedite implementation of the MSC Flight Safety Office policies and procedures. 
This provided a good opportunity to integrate the efforts of the MSC Flight Safety 
Office and the ASPO flight safety activities. The arrangement worked very well by 
opening up the communications channels between the various groups working different 
aspects of flightcrew and mission safety. At the same time, several  reliability and 
quality assurance elements at MSC were a l so  combined into a single office reporting 
directly to the Center Director. Although these changes in  the reliability and quality 
assurance (R&QA) organizations did not directly affect the Flight Safety Office, they 
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had the indirect effect of making available, on a day-to-day basis, data and information 
that were essential to Flight Safety Office personnel in  performing their tasks.  This 
interchange and coordination was aided by placing both organizations under the direc- 
tion of one person. 
A further enhancement of the MSC Flight Safety Office capabilities occurred 
in  late 1967 when additional support (contract) manpower was made available to the 
Flight Safety Office; this support consisted of experienced engineers trained in  
safety techniques and procedures. The local MSC group was par t  of a la rger  contract 
covering engineering and safety a t  MSC, NASA Headquarters, and the other NASA 
centers  involved in  the manned space-flight effort; thus, a large reservoir  of experi- 
enced engineering talent was available to provide assistance when required. These 
changes, both organizational and personnel, were sufficient to reestablish a planned, 
orderly,  and coordinated approach to crew and mission safety. 
THE MSC SAFETY OFFICE ACTIVIT IES 
Evolut ion of Systems Safety Disc ip l ine 
Under the new organization previously described, the MSC Safety Office activi- 
t ies  were defined as follows. 
1. To examine all phases of each mission for hazards ( i .e. ,  flight plans, crew 
procedures,  mission rules ,  design changes, contingency plans,  training, etc. ) 
2. To  examine all mission-related ground activities that involved the flightcrews 
and backup crews for  hazards (i. e. , extravehicular-activity (EVA) procedures,  crew 
training, ground tes t  and checkout, simulated flight tes ts ,  vacuum chamber tes ts ,  
recovery training, etc.  ) 
3. To assure  that hazards identified in i tems (1) and (2) were appropriately 
resolved for  future missions and ground operations (Resolution of hazards was to 
be accomplished through normal channels used to implement the Apollo Spacecraft 
Program. ) 
A s  a par t  of the foregoing effort, the safety offices of the major contractors 
were strengthened to ensure the proper integration of their  own and their  subcon- 
t ractors '  safety efforts. The MSC did not require that the subcontractors institute 
a dedicated safety office; it was considered that the responsibility for safety should 
rest with the major contractors who would eventually receive the hardware/software 
f rom the subcontractors. In this manner, the major contractors maintained an 
overall  safety effort' with their  own safety staffs. The approach proved acceptable. 
The Safety Office personnel conducted their duties by active participation i n  
design reviews, test  procedure reviews, and the development of crew procedures. 
A s  safety i ssues  were identified, they were resolved immediately o r  were presented 
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to the ASPO for  resolution at scheduled meetings and milestone reviews. Typical 
reviews that safety personnel participated in  a r e  as  follows: 
1. Configuration Control Board 
2. Configuration Control Panel 
3 .  Preliminary Design Review 
4. Critical Design Review 
5 .  Design Certification Review 
6. Customer Acceptance Readiness Review 
7. Flight Readiness Review 
8. Crew Procedures Change Board 
9. Mission Rules Review 
10. Launch Readiness Review 
The ASPO and the MSC directorates involved in  the Apollo Spacecraft Program 
provided adequate forums for  formal discussion by the MSC Safety Office of any 
hazards that required attention. This management visibility in depth, operating in  
an atmosphere that encouraged personnel with problems to come forth and be heard,  
was a major contributing factor i n  enhancing the safety of the Apollo missions. In 
addition to these meetings and milestone reviews, the MSC Safety Office presented 
formal analyses and assessments  of systems safety and mission r i sks  to the ASPO 
and to the Center Director a t  each mission Flight Readiness Review. At that t ime, 
the Mission Hazard Analysis (refer to the appendix), which identified safety concerns 
as well as the rationale for acceptance of the r i sks ,  was documented for  the Flight 
Readiness Review Board. 
Hazardous and Cr i t i ca l  Tests 
The MSC flight safety engineers participated with teams composed of specialists 
f rom varying disciplines in reviewing the development and installation of facil i t ies,  
tes t  procedures, and special safety procedures to support hazardous tes t  activities 
at  MSC. Chief among these were the thermal-vacuum tests  conducted in  the Space 
Environment Simulation Laboratory in which manned spacecraft modules were 
subjected to simulated space environments in  vacuum chambers.  Safety personnel 
were concerned with the safety of test  personnel and tes t  subjects. They assessed  and 
evaluated the safety of the chambers including the associated plumbing, wiring, evac- 
uation systems, environmental control systems,  and p r e s s w e  vessels .  Detailed and 
thorough operational readiness inspections and tes t  readiness  reviews were conducted 
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before commencement of manned tests.  Safety personnel had key ro les  in  these tasks  
and in  the development of safety parameters  and their  l imits  for  u se  in  manned testing. 
Certified tes t  safety officers participated in the manned tes t s  to ensure adherence to 
these established parameters  and l imits.  
System Safety Assessments 
System safety assessments  consisting of hazard analyses and special safety 
studies of Apollo contractor-furnished equipment, Government-furnished equipment, 
ground support equipment, and experiments were performed. These assessments  were  
accomplished by (1) analyses of ground support equipment to determine interfaces with 
flight hardware that could adversely affect crew safety; (2) performance of detailed 
evaluations i n  those design and operational a reas  shown to exhibit r i sk  potential; 
(3)  performance of or  participation in  hazard trade-off studies of designs, operational 
procedures,  and mission concepts; and (4)  detailed analyses of those proposed changes 
to subsystems, operational procedures, plans, rules ,  and activities considered to 
have safety impact. 
To aid in  the safety analysis of extremely complex systems,  "fault-tree" 
analyses were conducted. These were logic diagrams that represented the mechanical, 
electrical, and/or chemical interfacing points between subsystems. The analyses 
were a valuable tool in identifying potential hazards. 
In the Apollo Program,  hazard analyses were performed for  man/machine 
interface to isolate crew safety concerns. Trade-off studies and engineering assess- 
ments for  compliance with system safety cr i ter ia  were performed relating to crew 
safety, operational personnel safety, and system safety. Trade-off studies were 
also performed for specific hardware and operational areas, so that the relative crew 
r i sks  for  any of several  alternative solutions might be compared. 
Operational safety assessments  were performed on crew procedure changes, 
flight plans, mission rules ,  crew checklists, and crew training to ensure adequacy 
and compatibility of crew procedures and flight operations for  each Apollo mission. 
Hazardous procedures were identified and recommendations were made to reduce the 
r i sk  by modification of the existing procedures. The review of operational tasks 
resulted in  procedure change requests,  special studies of potential operational con- 
cerns ,  safety evaluation of mission operations, and documentation of crew and mission 
operational hazards. 
Safety evaluations of flight hardware consisted of (1) assessment  of the config- 
uration.differences between vehicles to determine whether system o r  subsystem 
changes had introduced any new hazards into the vehicle; (2) review of waivers or 
deviations of specifications in  manufacturing, tes t ,  or  checkout procedures; and 
(3)  sneak circuit  analyses (SCA) of wiring systems to detect potential hazards f rom 
wiring o r  electrical  system incompatibilities. A sneak circuit  is a latent electrical  
path that can  cause an  unwanted function to occur o r  inhibit a desired function without 
regard to  component failures.  The SCA was f i r s t  used on the Apollo 7 spacecraft and 
was performed f o r  all subsequent spacecraft of the Apollo Program, both the LM and 
the CSM. 
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Mission Risk Assessment 
Concurrent with the effor t  to provide system safety assessments ,  each individual 
mission was analyzed as an integral unit in  an effort to isolate and assess r i sks  to 
mission operations and crew safety. Once a hazard was identified and evaluated, i t  
was brought to the attention of program management. It was then tracked throughout 
the mission preparation period until corrected by an  engineering o r  procedural change 
(usually a decision of the Configuration Change Board or  Panel) o r  approved by the 
Safety Office and the ASPO as an  acceptable r isk.  
Periodic meetings were held with the safety personnel of the major contractors 
to discuss and evaluate hardware and operational problems that might have potential 
crew safety impact. The reports  emanating from these meetings provided an 
up-to-date status of safety concerns under evaluation and of safety i ssues  to be 
resolved. A safety concern was a specific hazard requiring positive action to correct ;  
a safety issue w a s  a potential hazard,  the implications of which had not been completely 
resolved. The status report  was forwarded to the ASPO and to the R&QA organizations 
which, in  periodic meetings with safety personnel, considered each safety concern f o r  
proper resolution. 
A mission r isk assessment  was performed for each Apollo mission to provide 
a final and definitive evaluation of residual hazards and r i sks  affecting the crew. 
The mission r i sk  assessment  supported the Flight Readiness Review at MSC. This  
report  highlighted the more significant crew safety r i sks  assessed  during the mission 
buildup period, the resul ts  of analyses of these r i sks ,  and supporting rationale for  
acceptance of residual hazards,  where appropriate. A portion of the Apollo 16 
Mission Risk Assessment is included in  the appendix. 
Mission Monitoring and Postflight Eva1 uation 
The work described in  previous paragraphs dealt with preflight safety activities. 
However, the responsibility of the MSC Safety Office did not end with the launch of an  
Apollo mission. Mission monitoring support was provided to enable real-t ime safety 
engineering support i n  the assessment  and evaluation of mission discrepancies and 
identification of hazardous trends that might have a potential impact on crew safety 
or  mission success.  Continuous monitoring of flight hardware and the flightcrew made 
possible the identification of real or  potential safety hazards.  Recommendations fo r  
the resolution or elimination of these hazards were routed through the Spacecraft 
Analysis Network (SPAN) fo r  verification by the appropriate subsystem monitor, and 
to the Mission Control Center for  final approval and implementation by the Flight 
Director. 
The Safety Office further participated in the postflight review of failures and 
anomalies associated with system performance or  crew procedures that had safety 
implications on succeeding missions. Any such failure o r  anomaly was examined at 
the appropriate contractor's plant to make a determination of the actual cause. When 
such a determination was made, the suspect pa r t  o r  procedure for  each succeeding 
mission was reevaluated, redesigned, retested, rewritten, o r  eliminated. 
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Audi ts  
To ensure that the safety requirements were being met and that continued empha- 
sis was  being placed on system safety by all participants, periodic audits were per-  
formed by the MSC Safety Office a t  major contractor production, assembly, checkout, 
and tes t  facilities. The contractors were required to develop system safety checklists 
that detailed those s teps  introduced in their facilities to ensure adherence to the safety 
requirements. The checklists were used by MSC Safety Office personnel a t  the con- 
t ractor  facilities to provide on-the-spot assurance that the requirements were actively 
implemented. 
Motivation al Pr og r a  m s 
To achieve a high level of safety, reliability, and quality consciousness in  all 
program participants, it  became evident that a singular motivational program was  
required. People tend to think of safety, reliability, and quality as abstract  t e rms;  
the problem was  to make that abstraction real ,  tangible, and relatable and then to 
keep the awareness of these important functions as an active effort constantly before 
them. 
The Manned Flight Awareness Program was introduced early in  the Apollo Pro-  
gram to fill this need. The cooperation of a popular cartoonist w a s  solicited to make 
his comic beagle "Snoopy" (from the cartoon s t r ip  "Peanuts") the principal spokes- 
man for the program. Motivational posters featuring Snoopy in space togs were soon 
in evidence wherever people were a t  work on the Apollo Program. The Snoopy 
messages constantly emphasized the need for  care  and attention to detail. 
The astronauts contributed to the success of the program. They attended 
functions at each of the space-flight centers,  honoring contributors to the program 
by presenting Snoopy pin awards. Apollo crewmen toured the facilities of the major 
contractors to meet the workers who were building and testing the Apollo mission 
hardware. 
Special Studies and Assessments 
1 A s  the Apollo Program matured and progressed, missions became longer and more complex. The NASA began to take optimum advantage of lunar surface explo- 
and service module (CSM) lunar orbits by incorporation of experiment hardware in a 
bay of the service module. Each element of growth contained potential crew hazards,  
and each w a s  the subject of a special safety assessment by the MSC Safety Office. 
The principal special assessments  a r e  discussed in  the following paragraphs. 
I ration through the use of more sophisticated experiments packages and of the command 
, 
I 
Extravehicular activities. - The Apollo Program included a wide variety of EVA'S 
beginning with Apollo 9 when the lunar module (LM) pilot first stepped out of the LM 
while in  Earth orbit. The first Apollo EVA safety assessment (conducted before the 
mission) resulted in  a listing of 10 criticality 1 hazards,  each of which had to be 
analyzed to determine i t s  probability of occurrence. Each potential hazard w a s  
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finally deemed improbable after a lengthy rationale was prepared, which reinforced 
confidence in  the hardware design and testing. None of the following 10 potentially 
hazardous events occurred. 
1. Ventricular fibrillation i n  the LM pilot could occur.  
2. Collision with the spacecraft might rupture the pressure  garment assembly 
(PGA). 
3 .  The EVA astronaut might lose contact with and attachment to the spacecraft, 
4. The EVA astronaut might have a failed portable life-support system/oxygen 
purge system (PLSS/OPS). 
5. Undetected carbon monoxide might be present in the EVA astronaut PGA. 
6. The open failure of the oxygen purge system (OPS) might cause a rupture in  
the PGA. 
7 .  The EVA astronaut rescue capability might not be immediately available. 
8. The OPS redundancy might be lost. 
9. Degradation of the OPS would leave only marginal contingency EVA capability. 
10. Loss of the LM attitude control might render the LM unstable and would make 
recovery difficult. 
In a s imilar  manner, the f i r s t  lunar surface EVA on Apollo 11 w a s  analyzed before 
the mission, and this analysis isolated the following 11 potentially hazardous a reas  of 
concern. The Safety Office prepared recommendations for  the elimination o r  reduc- 
tion of these potential hazards and forwarded them to the appropriate organizations 
for  consideration. Most of the recommendations were accepted. 
1. Pyrophoric reaction of lunar material  with the L M  oxygen atmosphere 
might occur. 
2 .  A rupture of the lunar contingency sample container might occur in  the cabin. 
3. Damage to the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) might occur if a crewman 
were to fall on the lunar surface. 
4. Crewmen might be unable to detect the presence of sinkholes, deep dust 
pits ,  or  subsurface faults. 
5. Because of scratching o r  tearing on spacecraft  protuberances, a compromise 
of the EMU pressure,  thermal,  o r  radiation integrity might occur.  
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6. Inability of the crewmen to obtain adequate footing on the plus-Z footpad 
could be caused by dust o r  debris acquired at landing. 
7. Inability to  determine the temperature of tools, equipment, et cetera, could 
result  i n  damage to the EMU upon touch. 
8. A fallen crewman might be unable to  recover and return to the LM before 
the loss  of EMU consumables. 
9. Crewmen ingress  o r  egress  could be difficult when the plus- Z footpad is not 
i n  contact with the lunar surface. 
10. Deployed television camera cable and S-band antenna cables could pose a 
tripping hazard to crewmen. 
11. The crewman inside the LM might be unable to observe the egressing 
crew man. 
Apollo lunar surface experiments. - Apollo 11 car r ied  a comparatively simple 
package of scientific hardware for  deployment on the lunar surface. These experi- 
ments, however, had some inherent potential hazards that were assessed before the 
flight. Of major concern was the fuel capsule for the radioisotopic thermoelectric 
generator used to supply power to the Apollo lunar surface experiments package. 
The capsule used plutonium-238 as its isotope, and the. inadvertent re lease of this 
radioactive substance was a matter of great concern. The capsule was subjected to 
analysis by the Safety Office and representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission 
who concluded that the device was safe to u s e  when used according to the prescribed 
procedures. To i l lustrate the thoroughness of this assessment  , consideration was 
given to the possibility that the fuel capsule might be returned to the Earth atmosphere 
in the event of a mission abort. The analysis concluded that the capsule, as designed, 
was adequate to survive reentry and would release no radioactivity. This conclusion 
proved cor rec t  when the Apollo 13 mission aborted and the LM (which had served as 
a "lifeboat" for  the astronauts when the CSM w a s  partly disabled) reentered the 
Earth atmosphere and broke up over the Pacific Ocean. The fuel capsule was sti l l  
on board and, as  predicted by the preflight analysis, did not contaminate the atmos- 
phere with radioactive material. 
Other significant studies. - Other significant studies made between 1969 and 1972 
included a system safety engineering hazard analysis of the LM pyrotechnics and the 
CSM launch vehicle separation pyrotechnics (Feb. 1969), a LM-6 crit ical  switch study 
breaker review (Sept. 1969), a study of crew distractions during crit ical  mission 
phases (Feb. 1970), a system safety assessment of the Apollo 12 anomalies and of 
the failure mechanism during the initial boost phase (Feb. 1970), a study of the active 
seismic experiment (Aug. 1970), a study of the CSM return enhancement provisions 
I 
I  
(Sept. 1969), a CSM circuit  breaker accessibility study (Sept. 1969), a LM circuit 
I (Dec. 1970), and a study of the lunar seismic profiling experiment (Dec. 1972). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The success  of the United States manned space-flight program has been, to a 
great  extent, a direct resul t  of the emphasis placed on safety by the management of 
the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center). 
The basic safety objective has  been to identify hazards and to ensure that these 
hazards a r e  either eliminated o r  reduced to an  acceptable level. With the exception 
of the Apollo spacecraft  204 fire and perhaps the Apollo 13 abort ,  the hazards have 
been adequately identified and properly resolved. 
The reorganization of the NASA Headquarters and Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
safety efforts after the spacecraft 204 fire was necessary for the complex and ex- 
panded efforts of the Apollo Program. A greatly enhanced Safety Office visibility and 
comprehension of day-to-day safety status resulted in  the reestablishment of a satis- 
factory approach to crew and mission safety. The fundamental change in  organization 
that proved most effective was gathering the safety efforts under a single office that 
reported to the Center Director. 
The establishment of formally documented hazard analyses for  each mission was 
effective in identifying all significant hazards and assuring a satisfactory resolution 
of hazards a t  an appropriately high level i n  the center organization. 
A safety program requires  an adequate complement of qualified safety engineers, 
a free hand to make independent assessments ,  and the full support of management. 
With these ingredients, an effective safety program is assured. 
The Manned Flight Awareness Program,  introduced early in  the Apollo Program,  
w a s  a motivational tool used to achieve a high level of safety, reliability, and quality 
consciousness in  all program participants. I ts  success  was greatly enhanced by 
astronaut participation. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, November 14, 1974 
039-00-00-00-72 
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APPEND I X 
APOLLO 16 M I S S I O N  R I S K  ASSESSMENT 
EXCERPTS AND SUMMARIES 
The following pages have been extracted as typical examples of the Apollo 16 
Mission Assessment Report. 
"1.2 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this assessment is to define and evaluate the 
r i sks  associated with the Apollo 16 flight and lunar surface 
activities, to provide justification for discounting or  accept- 
ing these r i sks ,  and to present an overall picture of the 
mission relative to crew safety. 
"1.3 SCOPE 
"1.4 
This document is limited to the presentation of the assess -  
ment of the Apollo 16 mission as related to flight crew safety 
from lift-off through earth landing. The assessment included 
analysis of each mission phase, including procedures, con- 
figurations, and potential impact of previously-observed 
anomalies on flight crew safety. This document applies to 
the MSC Flight Readiness commitments. Subsequent anom- 
alies are evaluated on a day-to-day basis up to the launch time 
and a r e  incorporated into this document as required. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1.4.1 The new r i sks  introduced into the Apollo 16 mission a r e  
acceptable and provide no flight constraints. 
1.4.2 Assessment of the planned lunar surface activities, includ- 
ing the longer EVA'S, longer t raverses ,  and delta lunar 
surface experiments has uncovered no safety concerns 
which preclude the lunar activities o r  any planned lunar 
surface experiments. Improvement in the active seismic 
experiment f rom Apollo 14 has increased the safety margin 
for Apollo 16. 
1.4.3 Assessment of the rendezvous technique changes which a r e  
incorporated for Apollo 16 indicate they should minimize 
controllable e r r o r s  in  the rendezvous calculations, thus 
improving overall mission success  and crew safety. 
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1.4.4 Boom retraction modification of adding.proximity switches 
has  increased safety by .enabling determination if booms 
are sufficiently re t racted before an SPS burn. (See note 1 
below. ) 
1 
2 1.4.5 Planned CM in-flight demonstrations have been assessed 
for  concerns related to crew safety, and no constraining 
safety concerns were identified. (See note 2 below.) 
The mass  spectrometer and gamma ray spectrometer 
experiments were extended from the SM Scientific Instru- 
mentation Module by retractable booms. It is cr i t ical  to 
have assurance that these booms are properly ret racted 
before attempting an  SPS burn; an unretracted boom could 
conceivably wrap around the SPS nozzle extension. Prox- 
imity switches were added on Apollo 16 to provide the crew 
positive assurance of boom retraction pr ior  to the SPS 
burn. In addition, a boom jettison capability was added. 
Note 1. 
3 
Note 2. During t ransear th  coast ,  Apollo 16 crew conducted the 
following inflight demonstrations, each requiring experi- 
ment hardware and procedures which were subjected to 
safety analysis : 
(1) ALFMED (Apollo Light Flash Moving Emulsion 
Detector) 
(2) MEED (Microbial Ecology Evaluation) 
(3) Electrophoresis In- Flight Demonstration 
(4) Biostack Experiment (M2 11) 
1.4.6 Safety assessments  of anomalies occurring during manned 
environmental tests, previous flights, and vehicle ground 
tes t s  have disclosed no significant safety concerns. 
"1.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
None. 





??1.6 SAFETY STATEMENT APOLLO 16 MISSION 
The Safety Office assessment of the planned Apollo 16 
mission, spacecraft functions, and hardware failures dis- 
closed no safety concerns which constrain the Apollo 16 
flight scheduled for  April 16, 1972. The assessment  is 
based on safety analyses performed in  coordination with 
and obtained from the Program Office, E&D, FOD, FCOD, 
MR&OD, SR&QA, 
4 and the hardware contractors.  '' 
Section 2.0 provided a discussion of all constraining and nonconstraining 
safety concerns evaluated during the mission assessment.  These concerns were 
assessed for  crew safety during the period leading to the preparation of the report  
and were published in  the MSC Safety Concerns document, released biweekly. The 
information included the issue,  action, and status of each concern. The following list 
enumerates the concerns contained in  the Apollo 16 Mission Assessment Report. 
1. Range/range-rate meter glass  shattered 
2. Command and service module (CSM) criticality 1 switches 
3. Gyro-display coupler aline function 
4. Scratched Lexan window shade 
5 .  Loose object in  the cabin fan 
6. Unexplained pressure  increase in  the CSM tunnel 
7. Broken bacteria fi l ter  on water gun 
8 .  Main oxygen regulator failure 
9.  Premature  deployment of main parachute 
10. Failure of docking ring to sever  
11. Extravehicular glove wear 
12. Command module (CM) reaction control system (RCS) fuel tank 
excessive delta pressure  
13. Parachute reefing-line cutter 
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Entry monitor subsystem "thrust on" light 
P res su re  garment assembly qualification tes t  failure 
Suited o r  unsuited scientific instrument module door jettison 
The CM RCS oxidizer tank bladder overpressure 
Impact tes t  failure of helmet 
CSM- 113 propellant utilization and gaging system anomaly 
Trapped CM RCS propellant overpressure 
Circuit breaker mechanical latch problem 
Earth landing system main parachute fa i lure  
The following information is contained in  the report  covering i tem 22, which 
i l lustrates the depth at  which each i tem ( 1  to 22) was considered. 
"Issue - The crew verified and photographic coverage confirmed that one 
main parachute collapsed at an altitude of 6,000 feet during the Apollo 15 
mission. Four of the six nylon risers had released their suspension-line 
load. Loss of one main parachute exposed the crew to higher, but acceptable, 
loads; however, failure of more than one parachute could resul t  in  crew loss .  
"Action - An NR investigation and analysis revealed the cause of main para- 
chute collapse not to be forward heat shield, the suspension links, o r  the steel  
risers being pulled from the flower pot. The most probable cause of the 
anomaly was the burning r a w  fuel (monomethylhydrazine) being expelled during 
later portions of the depletion firing. This resulted in  the exceeding of the 
parachute-riser and suspension-line temperature l imits.  Corrective action 
taken has been to change the mode 1A abort  t imer  to 6 1  seconds, to design 
and qualify new connection links made of Inconel 718, to load propellants to 
achieve a slightly oxidizer-rich mixture for  a possible depletion-burn purge, 
and to require certification of the CM to land in  the water with pressurized 
propellants onboard. Oxidizer and parachute tests at the NASA WSTF 
(White Sands Test  Facility) are being conducted to investigate the effects of 
the CM RCS dump burn depletion and purge on the parachute assemblies.  
Recovery procedures and training are being updated to avoid possible 
crew exposure to toxic propellants as a resul t  of the single failure points 
of the pressurized tanks at shutdown. 
5 
5North American Rockwell Corporation, pr ime Apollo contractor. 
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"Status - The concern has been closed on the basis of: 
(a) The decision to land on water with pressurized tanks and 
(b) The decision to extend the mode 1Z regime. The Safety Office will 
continue to scrutinize the current WSTF RCS/oxidizer tes t s  for  impact. " 
Section 3 . 0  of the Mission Assessment Report contained the Flight Operations 
Safety Analysis. The analysis was divided into approximately nine a r e a s  with each 
addressing a mission phase; for example, launch through orbit  insertion, lunar 
orbit  insertion, lunar module powered descent, lunar surface activities, e t  cetera.  
Section 4.0 defined the safety evaluation of flight hardware differences 
between the mission under assessment and previous missions, the waivers and 
deviations, and the sneak circuit analyses for  the upcoming mission. 
Section 5.0 covered the manned environmental ground tes t s  pertinent to the 
upcoming mission performed at  the Space Environment Simulation Laboratory 
at the MSC. 
Section 6.0 subjected anomalies f rom previous missions to analysis. Includ- 
ed were numerous anomalies f rom the previous missions that were evaluated for 
safety impact; breakdown by command and service module, lunar module, and 
Government-furnished equipment; and the status of each with respect to the up- 
coming mission. 
Section 7.0 was an evaluation of real-time flight problems and was  not con- 
tained in  the f i r s t  two releases  of the Mission Assessment Report; this section was 
added after splashdown and recovery. 
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